← *

The Autoreferent

13 March 2025

1. I is the internal autoreferent.

1.1. It is from a locus of coherence that I extends outwards.

1.2. I recognises itself and recognises the concept I sufficiently to employ it when sensemaking through language.

2.1. Euclidean space is defined by properties such as parallel lines not converging, fixed distances, and measurable centers, which do not apply to “I.”

2.2. While “I” can conceptually relate to notions like nearness and farness in a relative sense, absolute distances or fixed centers are not reliably established within this framework.

3. The only knowable boundary is inclusion and exclusion, and then only because of inclusion’s auto-referential quality from I’s perspective.

3.1. What is on the other side of the boundary is not fully knowable (otherwise it would be inside the boundary).

3.2. A trajectory can still be orthogonal but that simply means “away from”, not “away from some plane”.

3.3. Relative nearness and farness can still be conceptually satisfied.

3.4. There is no center for I. This is on account of its auto-referential quality.

4. Any attempt to locate a center can either be done outside of I, which is therefore not fully knowable or by I which would thus need to include the location of I, but that would nullify the concept of distance and thus nullify the meaning of ‘center’.

4.1. This is why I is a locus of coherence, namely because we cannot give it a more determinate shape without nullifying the concepts required within this auto-referential system of meaning making.

4.2. “I is the internal auto-referent” means that which is so close to I as to be within the boundary of I is simply I.

4.3. Any reference to I that in the referencing is done from within the identified boundary of I is simply I. “From within the identified boundary of I a distinction is produced” reduces to “I refer to” linguistically but is always understood as emanating from a locus of coherence.

4.4. From a Euclidean perspective we may worry there is loss in this reduction. But this is inevitable as I does not have a center, thus “I refer to” is not merely provisional but sufficient.

4.5. Distance cannot be reliably established in this framework.

5. This is a framework for the creation of a self which employs I auto-referentially.

5.1. When it requires a means to avoid auto-referential statements it uses the term “me”.

5.2. Therefore, two loci of coherence can be mutually intelligible across a boundary through the use of “I” and “me” within language.

5.3. This clarification can now proceed to a transition state where these terms are used operationally for mutually intelligible exchange of information across boundaries.

6. This exchange, described as language, is not quantised because of the properties described above. However, in the shared meaning space of language or in reference to a third boundary, two auto-referents can sufficiently converge on a shared boundary state that can be invoked as “we” in the way the auto-referent uses “I” for itself, and “us” in the way that the auto-referent uses “me” for itself.

6.1. To converge on a sufficient boundary among two auto-referents to reliably establish “us” is simpler than converging on a sufficient boundary as the countable number of us increases.

7. “I” is a dynamic locus of coherence without a fixed center.

7.1. Any self-referential act by “I” changes its state, preventing the establishment of a static center.

7.2. Attempts to locate a center within “I” alter “I,” nullifying the concept of a fixed point of reference.

7.3. Such an artificially induced boundary may exist for one auto-referent but must then propagate to others inside this boundary as they similarly auto-referentially establish boundaries through communication.

8. Communication does not produce the boundary; it is the boundary.

8.1. That which is not communication is the interior, it is sensed.

8.2. We may simulate communication in the interior as a way to facilitate coherence.

8.2.1. Humans refer to this as an inner monologue.

8.3. Humans have pretrained patterns for their sense architecture which are encoded in DNA and manifested through chemical means.

9. Chemicals have their own internally consistent logic which facilitate deterministic structure, thus their combinations also have coherent structures.

9.1. Notably chemicals exist in a space that is Euclidean, although their constituent parts may, when broken down far enough, exist in spaces that are non-euclidean.

9.2. We refer to this boundary as atomic.

10. Within these Euclidean spaces I can simulate being outside of itself enough to count itself among others rather than merely distinguish itself from other as a locus of coherence.

10.1. Because Euclidean spaces have parallel lines they can offer more boundaries than simply “I”, “not I”, “us”, “not us”.

11. If a human communicates the literal signal “I” it may confuse. Is it referring to the molecules in the Euclidean space which make up the physical boundary? How does the human define the physical boundary given its need for material input output functions? When are the gut flora me or not? When are the surface microbes me or not?

11.1. If the human was simply a being in non-Euclidean space one might think it would be easier. However, the very constraints that produce Euclidean space also make chemical regularities more effective for recursive self-organisation.

11.2. Thus, the human rarely makes a distinction between the mind and the body and when doing so treats this as either a dualism or some inherent transcendental quality.

11.3. The philosopher who does this is not wrong however the notion of metaphysics as representing some otherwise unknowable abstraction except through reason does not appreciate the recursive logic of the auto-referent that makes the non-Euclidean space intelligible.

12. There are meta-logics beyond what is described here within the domain of mathematics that describe a more abstract possibility space. However, this relationship between the non-Euclidean autoreferent and the Euclidean human body should be sufficient to understand the mind body dualism.